Hundreds of mercenary firms are operating around the world today, most offering training and logistical support to their varied clientele (sometimes governments, sometimes rebel movements, sometimes crime lords). The largest firms, however, such as Executive Outcomes during the late 1990s and Blackwater Worldwide today (now Xe Services LLC), are capable of deploying their own self-sufficient combat units trained in VIP and convoy protection and offensive operations. With mercenary firms handling a rapidly expanding repertoire of military operations it was inevitable that peacekeeping would be suggested as well.

In the July/August 2009 issue of the Atlantic Monthly (“Quick Fixes”) James S. Gibney argued that mercenaries offer the most effective solution to civil conflicts around the world. Gibney points out that despite the deployment of more than 18,000 peacekeepers to the Congo the UN has failed to protect the lives of millions since first arriving in 1999. With echoes of Srebrenica, one contingent of UN soldiers “failed to stop a massacre of 150 people taking place less than a mile away.” Other troops have rearmed militias by trading their weapons for ivory, gold and drugs.

Gibney argues that mercenaries, “small, highly-trained” strike forces who are proven insurgency-killers, offer the most promising future for peacekeeping. Most importantly, mercenaries will “go where they’re paid to go” (Gibney), allowing governments to act regardless of public opinion or military constraints. Prominent military historian Max Boot worries that without the more formidable security capabilities of PMCs, the many “pieces of paper” produced by the recurring rounds of negotiations will never carry any significance. So should the United Nations start thinking about deploying mercenaries on peacekeeping missions? Or is the use of private military forces more dangerous than Gibney and Boot would have us believe? A review of the following considerations may help clarify the issue.

-Casualties have undermined Western war efforts since Vietnam, and the images of a dead American soldier being dragged through the dusty streets of Mogadishu in 1994 effectively killed Operation Restore Hope. However, because mercenaries are not members of national militaries, their deaths are not included in the official casualty counts released to the public. If you want more sustained support for a combat mission use mercenaries to lessen the number of casualties that appear on the evening news. Few people can sympathize with shadowy organizations whose official presence is secreted by the government, and media will not be as interested in reporting their losses.

-Possibly the most professional soldiers in the world, many mercenaries are veterans of elite commando units such as the British Special Air Service. Their ranks are filled by adventurers, fortune seekers, unemployed soldiers and idealists. Whatever their individual backgrounds they make for a highly potent rank and file. However, few mercenaries have any familiarity with the more delicate demands of humanitarian intervention, operations that require significant restraint and flexibility (as we will see below, these are not skills common to PMCs).

In addition to employing soldiers with elite military training, security companies also arm their mercenaries with considerable firepower. While operating in Iraq, for example, employees of Blackwater Worldwide regularly hit the streets of Baghdad armed with M4 rifles, M240B machine guns and M203 40-millimeter grenade launchers, backed up by armoured cars and attack helicopters. The larger firms are also equipped with significant intelligence and logistics assets which can be used to support their own armies or those of national governments.

For small and medium military powers like Canada, mercenaries offer governments a readily available force multiplier, that is, they provide a trained and self-sufficient army ready for deployment upon payment. The Canadian government can hire a mercenary firm to provide such services as logistical support and intelligence in Darfur, even though most of the Army’s strength is already committed to Afghanistan.

-The occupation of Iraq has demonstrated that private military contractors operate in a legal grey zone, apparently immune from both civilian and military law. This is particularly worrisome given the amount of firepower they carry and their willingness to use it. In 2007, while escorting a VIP convoy, Blackwater operatives massacred 17 civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square after receiving enemy fire. While it was quickly established that the convoy had not come under attack and the killings unjustified, Blackwater was not seriously punished and resumed operations after a short hiatus.

The legal vacuum that protects PMCs is partially a result of their sudden reappearance in conflict zones. Where state security forces are subject to a detailed legal code developed over hundreds of years, there has been insufficient time to integrate mercenary forces into military law, or develop parallel legal structures for PMCs alone. Nor is this likely to happen anytime soon. Because civil law prohibits the state from interfering in the personnel affairs of a private corporation, it is up to the PMC to ensure that its mercenaries respect national laws and international regulations.

-But modern military contractors have raised more ethical challenges than legal ambiguities alone. As Rolf Uesseler wrote in his introduction to Servants of War,
“Seldom is it clear for whom they’re fighting, or who pays them or has sent them into action. Often no one can say to whom they’re responsible, if indeed anyone. Nor is anyone in any great hurry to inquire where they acquired their state-of-the-art military hardware, including tanks, attack helicopters, grenades, and missiles.”

-Finally, even if mercenaries were deployed in place of national soldiers as UN peacekeepers, they would (presumably) still have to operate under a United Nations mandate, one that is just as prohibitive to private soldiers as public ones. Gibney and Boot can argue that PMCs would bring their professionalism and resources to Darfur and deal with insecurity more effectively than the present UN mission, but it seems unlikely that Khartoum would consent to anything other than a traditional UN deployment, that is, one with national contingents and Security Council mandates. Using mercenaries as peacekeepers would be too tempting a loophole for Khartoum to ignore, and its inevitable demands for immediate withdrawal would carry some real legitimacy.

Some more pros and cons in point form:

-Pro: Rapid deployment of military forces to conflict zones.
-Pro: Potential UN area of operations expanded.
-Con: Use by the UN endows PMCs with significant legitimacy.
-Con: Refugees protected by PMCs viewed as “taking sides”, making them
more legitimate military targets. (Uesseler 196).
-Con: Aid organizations protected by PMCs lose their neutrality.
*See Uesseler Servants of War
So what do you think? Should we “unleash the dogs of peace” as Gibney and Boot advocate, or resist the temptation to use (probably more effective) mercenary forces in Darfur, thereby confronting the ethical dilemmas of using mercenaries more generally?

James S. Gibney, “Unleash the Dogs of Peace?” Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2009.

Max Boot, “Send in the mercenaries: Darfur needs someone to stop the bloodshed, not more empty UN promises. Council on Foreign Relations”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10798/send_in_the_mercenaries.html

Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army, (New York: Nation Books, 2007).

Rolf Uesseler, Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and the Profit of Conflict, (Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press, 2008).

Nicholas D. Kristof, “Sending Mercenaries Into Darfur”, The New York Times
http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/sending-mercenaries-into-darfur/

Blackwater’s ‘humanitarian’ subsidiary: Greystone LTD., http://www.greystone-ltd.com/security.html

While Sudan divestment campaigns have enjoyed sympathy and success across the United States and Canada, two core institutions of First World economic power remain active in Khartoum: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Since their inception following the Second World War, the IMF and World Bank have promoted free market values around the world, offering substantial loans to developing nations and encouraging the formation of vibrant capitalist markets with minimum state intervention. However, when a recipient nation defaults on its loan, harsh social and economic policies are imposed. As we will see, those policies have been decisive instruments of environmental degradation, starvation and ineffectual governance in Sudan. For these reasons, Steven Fake and Kevin Funk suggest that advocates must seriously consider encouraging action against the IMF and World Bank.

As a ‘reward’ for lending Arab support to the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace agreement, Sudan was loaned billions of dollars in development aid by the IMF and World Bank. However, the money “quickly vanished in the corruption ridden government and Western expatriate aid administrators, leaving Sudan with a debt equivalent to its entire GDP.” In response, the IMF ordered a slashing of the state budget and privatization of government services and corporations. The IMF and World Bank also encouraged the continued development of an export-based economy (particularly agricultural products).

These policies have damaged Sudan in the recent past and threaten further harm in the future. With cutbacks and privatization, the quality of public services (such as schools and hospitals) inevitably declined, while national wealth has been absorbed by Sudan’s upper classes. Equally troublesome are the potential consequences of low oil prices or disrupted production. As Fake and Funk demonstrate, privatization reduces the opportunity for government patronage -often the only way for weak national authorities to buy off dissenters- leaving foreign investors to seek protection from a black market economy of violence. While the discovery of oil has buttressed the Sudanese government and averted (for now) an authority meltdown, any long-term decline in prices or disrupted production could expose the Sudanese government to dissenting forces. Because Darfur is challenged by desertification, lawlessness and a communications disconnect with Khartoum, a lasting peace for the region depends largely on a strong and responsive Sudanese central government. Unfortunately, even a stable government under IMF sponsorship may feel more accountable to the concerns of its “external backers” than those of its domestic constituents.

The IMF’s agricultural policies have also negatively affected Darfur. Traditional agricultural practices throughout Sudan emphasized the preservation of bush and forest fallow (for animal protein, timber and private crop production), and smaller scale production that left adequate reserves for personal consumption and did not depend on experimental hybrids. Under IMF encouragement, however, hundreds of thousands of acres were clearcut, “reducing humidity and cloud formation and increasing soil salinity.” Famines became more frequent throughout Sudan and the climate dryer, forcing farmers to open up new lands. Despite the surge in oil prices and production, agriculture remains a valuable export industry for Sudan. Now, with IMF approval, foreign companies are buying up huge tracts of Sudanese land, securing new food supplies as global agricultural output falls behind rampant population growth. To date, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates have purchased a combined total of 720,000 hectares, with another 378,000 in development. Unfortunately for the people of Darfur they will see none of that food anytime soon.

A new approach to Sudanese aid should be crafted, one that does not force the dismantling of state machinery and plants the interest of Sudanese people (including Darfurians) firmly before those of international creditors. The consequences of failure are already evident today, and under current regime no aid is better than IMF aid.

Gwynne Dyer, “African Land Grab”
http://www.gwynnedyer.com/articles/Gwynne%20Dyer%20article_%20%20African%20Land%20Grab.txt

Joseph Winter, “Khartoum booms as Darfur burns”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6573527.stm

Steven Fake and Kevin Funk, “The Scramble for Africa: Darfur- Intervention and the USA,” (Montreal; New York; London: Black Rose Books, 2009). (particularly pages 28-30)

Jay O’Brien, “Sowing the seeds of famine: the political economy of food deficits in Sudan” in World Recession and the Food Crisis in Africa ed. Peter Lawrence, (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1986).

See also IMF and World Bank websites.

John R. Matchim

In a March 5 article that appeared in The Washington Post, Merrill A. McPeak and Kurt Bassuener argued that instead of “decisive action,” the international community provided Darfur refugees with “the palliatives of a sputtering aid effort.” Because air power –helicopter gunships, Fantan ground-attack jets and Antonov cargo planes improvised as bombers- is “central” to Janjaweed and government ground operations, McPeak and Bassuener urged NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Darfur that would operate out of Abeche, Chad. Equipped with fighter squadrons, aerial refuelers and command-and-control aircraft, the operation would quickly ground anything flyable west of Khartoum. With air superiority the West would be better positioned to negotiate a more effective peacekeeping mission. Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times agreed, even suggesting that 10,000 Sudanese People’s Liberation Army troops could be moved into Darfur from the south.

Nicholas D. Kristof, “Watching Darfuris Die,” The New York Times, March 7 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/opinion/08kristof.html?_r=1

Merrill A. McPeak and Kurt Bassuener, “Grounding Sudan’s Killers, The Washington Post, March 5 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/04/AR2009030403022.html

One week after the McPeak and Basseuener article, Guardian journalist Micah Zenko pointed out that despite a comprehensive NFZ over northern Iraq, a Kurdish rebellion in 1996 was still crushed after five Republican Guard and regular army divisions marched into Kurdistan as Anglo-American warplanes watched from above. Zenko also wondered why clearing the skies of Sudanese military aircraft would necessarily translate into inactivity on the ground. In addition, a letter to the editor that appeared in The Washington Post argued that a NFZ would change the balance of power on the ground, emboldening the rebel groups to take the offensive (much as the Kosovo Liberation Army did in 1999 under the cover of NATO air power). Finally, injecting air power into Darfur, rather than increasing Western/United Nations leverage, could only further distance the combatants by picking sides. Considering political dialogue (or lack thereof) was a significant cause of the current conflict, armed intervention could have very serious repercussions for the foreseeable future.

Micah Zenko, “Say no to a Darfur no-fly zone,” Guardian, March 12 2009
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/mar/12/darfur-no-fly-zone

Alan J. Kuperman, “No to a Darfur No-Fly Zone,” The Washington Post, March 10 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/09/AR2009030902475.html

Also see Agnes van Ardenne, Mohamed Salih, Nick Grono and Juan Mendez, Explaining Darfur (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2006): 22.

The debate around the feasibility of a Darfur NFZ has only been touched upon here, and a simple Google search will yield dozens of hits. So consider the different arguments presented in this entry, do some research, and post your thoughts on a Darfur NFZ here.

John R. Matchim

The conflict in Darfur has been fuelled by a decades long influx of foreign weaponry, ranging from small arms to helicopter gunships. China and the Russian Federation have been the most prominent suppliers of weaponry, but there are and were many other sources, some unknown. This entry will provide some basic background regarding Darfur’s weapons importers and highlight the international nature of the conflict, with both national governments and hidden gunrunners vying for a share of the slaughter’s profits. The plethora of actors and factors involved in the arming of the region highlight the futility of international intervention without real negotiations between the warring factions.

The People’s Republic of China

Though Africa contains some of the largest proven reserves of oil in the world, its fields have been largely ignored by Western companies. China has recognized the potential of African oil to satisfy the demands of its growing economy, and has made some of its most significant investments in Sudan. In exchange for oil, China has offered Sudan large quantities of small arms as well as some its most sophisticated military equipment. The arrangement is doubly beneficial to Beijing as it provides a rare opportunity for its inefficient and poor-quality arms industry to manufacture for the export market. Because Sudan has no significant arms industry of its own, equipment received from China outfits a large number of military units, and also provides China additional opportunities to provide maintenance and operational training. While the Sudanese army has been the recipient of most of the heavy equipment, small arms have been supplied to the Janjaweed. Chinese manufactured Fantan ground attack aircraft have also been photographed operating from El-Fasher.

http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR540192007&lang=e

The Russian Federation

The Russian state-owned arms industry is another major source of military equipment for the armed forces and militias of Sudan. After oil and natural gas, arms are one of Russia’s most lucrative exports. Because Moscow considers an independent (not reliant on foreign technology) and sophisticated defence-industrial complex vital to its national security interests, it is eager to export weapons wherever the opportunity arises. In 2002 Russia signed a military-technical cooperation agreement with Sudan and forced through the sale of MiG-29 combat aircraft despite opposition from human rights groups. The infamous helicopter gunships that have shaped public imagination are also of Russian origin. Like China, Russia is interested in expanding its central African influence and developing untapped oil and gas fields.

http://globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0812russia.htm

Libya, Sudan and Small Arms

The government militias and fractured rebel groups of Darfur have never found themselves for want of weapons. While some of that weaponry has been supplied by China, there are many other sources of assault rifles, heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and light mortars. Many of those weapons were transferred by the government of Sudan decades ago, arming villages and groups considered loyal to the Khartoum regime at a time of increasing environmental tension. The government, wanting to remain clear of societal stresses, chose to flood the region with weapons and let the problem sort itself out. During the 1980’s Muammar Gadaffi of Libya also funneled small arms into Darfur as part of a larger effort to establish a pro-Libyan sphere of influence throughout the North African region. Most recently, instability in neighboring Chad has left government arsenals vulnerable to attack by rebels, with many of the seized weapons easily finding their way across the vast and undefended border of Darfur.

Iran, Belarus, Egypt and the United Arab Emirate are other major suppliers of Sudanese weaponry. However, arming Darfur is not limited to state governments alone, and the profit potential of Darfur is no less significant than that of any other conflict. Indeed, because of the official United Nations arms embargo, gun running is a very lucrative venture. In September of 2007 a United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts estimated that between September 2006 and July 2007 private cargo companies transported a combined capacity of 13,000 tons of equipment and supplies into Darfur, much of it military

http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/darfur-time-uphold-arms-embargo

The multitude of actors, vital interests, vast and porous borders, regional instability and the profit motive have left Darfur awash in weaponry. Any United Nations arms embargo, no matter how tough, would be difficult or impossible to enforce without a significant military presence. However, easy access to weaponry practically makes armed resistance to such an effort inevitable. The problems of Darfur perhaps complicate and transcend the potential of armed international intervention, with a renewed emphasis on negotiations the best alternative. After all, if the causes of conflict are resolved, the demand for weapons will gradually disappear.

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/019/2007

This month, anti-genocide organizations and advocates are focusing on the repeated pledge of “never again” and asking the question: what have we learned? It is important for us to look to our mistakes and learn from them in order to honour that pledge. Genocide Prevention Month calls for a strong policy framework that focuses on drawing from these lessons for prevention of genocide. Stand chapters across the country will be holding events and rallies to urge the Canadian government to make acting against genocide a key foreign policy issue.

Stand Canada friend and supporter Education for Change has launched a blog project to join the movement. A new entry will be up daily to examine what genocide prevention really entails. The blog will focus on a different perspective with each entry: whether it is the voices of those whose families and friends have been affected by conflict, or discussion on how our generation have many choices to make in the face of genocide in order to prevent future occurrences. Check it out, and join in the discussion.

When reporters describe the combatants as ‘black Africans’ and Arabs, they imply that non-Muslim native Darfurians are being expelled by foreign Arabs, people totally unlike themselves in culture, language and ethnicity, recent arrivals searching for new lands to conquer. Understanding the conflict in these terms only raises the misconception that the Government of Sudan is not responsible for the violence, that the fighting is waged for localized reasons only. It also reinforces false stereotypes and cultural misunderstandings against Arabs perpetuated and strengthened by other ongoing international conflicts. Encouraging such assumptions, even unintentionally, perhaps threatens to discourage people from believing that a solution can be reached. Put bluntly, it angles the conflict as “just another Jihad.”

It is this misconception that I would like to address here. This entry will only serve to provide a brief introduction, while a forthcoming entry will offer an alternative way for media to report on Darfur that is just as saleable as the current one.

Painting Darfur as a war of religious and racial tensions is a tempting mistake to make. The idea that Darfur is a race war extends from our popular understanding that Africa is divided between two distinct halves. To the north, we assume, are the Arab lands stretching the length of the Mediterranean coast and the Red Sea, with the non-Arab, non-Islamic and black Africa south of the deserts. Sudan, and particularly Darfur, simply does not conform to this tidy geographic fault-line. Sudan is among Africa’s most diverse countries, with a plethora of distinct religious practices, languages and ethnicities. To package Darfur’s conflict as one between ‘black Africans’ and ‘Arabs’ is simply untrue.

To begin with, the majority of Darfurians are Muslims, either followers of the Sufi Tijoniyya sect from Morocco or the Ansar followers of the Mahdi, a movement that originally arrived from the Middle East. Darfur’s adherents adopted a relaxed approach to Islam and became renowned for their memorization of the Qur’an. Islam was adopted as the state religion of the Dar Fur Sultanate, and remains central to the spiritual and social lives of Darfurians today.

The ‘native black Africans’ are composed of six principle peoples, though in reality there are many more. The Fur were the founders of the ruling Dar Fur Sultanate and the engine of Islamic expansion, but they have always been a minority. In the north there is the Tunjur and Zaghwa, in the east the Berti and Birgid, and to the west the Masalit.

Darfur’s Arabs arrived in their greatest numbers between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries. They predominately emigrated as two groups: from east and west Africa came scholars and traders; and slowly moving south from the northwest came nomadic Juhayna Bedouins in search of grazing lands. For hundreds of years Arabs and non-Arabs intermarried, traded and co-existed peacefully. A common and resilient culture naturally emerged between them. Therefore, it is unreasonable to imply that the conflict is a war between native black Africans and foreign Arabs.

So who is fighting and why? The long answer is best left for another entry. While it is true that resource conflicts in Darfur during the 1980’s intensified because of ethnicity, and while it is true that both rebel groups and the Sudanese government are promoting the conflict as one of ethnicity to bind disparate groups under a common banner, the conflict does not strictly adhere to such simplicities. Darfur is ultimately a conflict about resources. It is about access to water and arable land, precious commodities that are found in increasingly short supply. It is also about having a voice in the central government, about a political disconnect with the capital Khartoum that overrides local differences.

Links and Sources:

An excellent article found in a news magazine often overlooked in the West: Carina Ray, “Are ‘Arabs’ killing ‘Black Africans’ in Darfur?” New African (January 2009) http://www.africasia.com/services/opinions/opinions.php?ID=2059&title=ray

For an explanation of Nicholas Kristof’s Darfur reporting see: Nicholas Kristof, “Genocide in Slow Motion,” The New York Review of Books (February 2006)http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18674

Alexander De Waal, “War in Darfur and the Search for Peace” (Harvard: Global Equity Initiative, 2007). Of particular interest is Chapter 4, “Islam and Islamism in Darfur” by Ahmed Kamal El-Din.

Anyways, the point is that this guy I. William Zartman basically began the academic study of civil wars by suggesting that they only end when the time is “ripe for resolution.” A civil war is considered ripe for resolution when both sides find themselves in a “mutually hurting stalemate”: i.e. no one has the upper-hand, both sides feel that they have little to gain from continued violence, and both sides will continue to take losses if the situation remains the same. Since Zartman first suggested the idea, there have been lots of additions and elaborations to the theory, but it’s still the same basic idea: international pressure to end a civil war will be most effective when the timing is right. Often the timing is right after some big event or change happens that makes both parties realize the pain and loss of continued fighting.

Other factors that affect the timing and effectiveness of a resolution would be:

- the role of outside actors
- the presence of spoilers (parties with nothing to gain and everything to lose from peace, e.g. warlords who gain power and money during war by hoarding valuable resources such as coltan or diamonds but would lose it all if peace allowed the government to establish legitimate trade avenues and businesses)
- the cohesion and unity of the negotiating parties.

I agree with Yoni in many ways. I believe the time is ripe for resolution right now for a number of reasons many of which he points out.

1. The government has recently realized that it can be painful to continue fighting, both because of the attack on the capital by the rebel Justice and Equality Movement last May and because of the possible arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. In the beginning of November, President Bashir of Sudan declared a unilateral ceasefire and began offering some concessions to the rebel groups, a step in the right direction.

2. The impending arrival of the Obama Administration with Senator Clinton as Secretary of State and Susan Rice as top UN diplomat signals a new era in American foreign policy, including pledges of multilateralism and action against genocide. It’s not clear how this team will react yet to the situation in Sudan, but it clearly presents an opportunity for a new approach.

3. There seems to be a concerted effort by both African and Arab leaders to convince President Bashir of the benefits of peace. This has not always been the case (especially on the part of Egypt) so it is welcome news. In particular, people are talking about the Qatari initiative, which seems to hold some very good ideas.

4. Oil prices are down, exposing the government to economic realities a bit more. China also seems to be taking less interest in protecting Sudan recently, possibly because of their own economic worries.

The key challenges?

1. Getting the rebels together. There are still numerous different groups in slight competition with each other, leaving no real negotiating partner. The Justice and Equality Movement and Sudanese Liberation Army led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur are the two major groups, but there are tons of other little ones. Many of them feel like their position can only get better from here so are not super-eager to negotiate, partly because of international criticism of the government. The key is to make sure that the most important ones who are capable of disrupting any peace process are included while the trouble-makers are ostracized.

2. Implementing and monitoring any agreements, including disarming Janjawiid and other militias. There are so many disparate and rogue elements within the region of Darfur now that it is hard to say who really has enough control there to implement agreements or take steps towards peace.

3. Making sure that the camps for internally displaced people do not ignite fresh violence. Generally speaking, people in these camps have no interest in peace with the Government after so many years of abuse and must see some sort of benefit to negotiations in order to support them.

4. Making sure that the North-South peace agreement continues to be implemented and does not fall apart.

There are probably many more factors that I can’t pull into my head right now, but those are some ideas to stew on for now. If now really is a “ripe” time for resolution, then it is the perfect time for Canada to step up its diplomatic role. Especially with the international coalition that seems to be forming around the Qatari initiative. With some serious pressure, Canada and the US could help the situation become even more ripe and push both sides towards peace. They could also help monitor any agreements that are made to build confidence on both sides.

And if you have managed to read through this tome of a post, then you might as well leave a comment to let me know what you think!

Of the books on there, many of them I personally have not yet read. I have mentioned Not on Our Watch before, the quintessential advocate’s guide to Darfur complete with suggestions, tools, and calls to action. For the avid scholar, anything by Alex de Waal is recommended. He is THE recognized expert on Darfur and Sudan, although he raises some interesting questions about the advocacy movement, particularly celebrity activism. For a history of genocides, Samantha Power’s A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide is a must-read, although personally sometimes the style of writing is too journalistic for me – ie. policy-makers are damned if they do, damned it they don’t. However, it is definitely the best compiled history of genocides I have encountered yet.

In terms of gut-wrenching, emotive writing, I would point to either Dallaire or Philip Gourevitch’s accounts of Rwanda. The Philip Gourevitch book, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families, sparked my interest in human rights and preventing mass atrocities. It is really well-written, mixing anecdotes, interviews, and well-researched histories of the conflict and country. Highly recommended.

I would love to hear everyone else’s thoughts on recommended reading. Please send me an email with suggestions and ideas. And thanks to Ruth once again!

UPDATE: Check out the Comments section for some more good recommendations!

I have recently been given the privilege of reading a briefing paper about one expert’s opinions about the future of Sudan. Unfortunately, I am still awaiting the word as to whether I am allowed to say who or what this paper was, but I thought that in the meantime I would transmit some of its extremely illuminating and troubling details.

The Premise: How to prevent the entire country of Sudan from erupting into a huge war when the South votes for independence in the referendum scheduled for 2011?

For those who don’t know, the peace treaty between the North and South signed in 2005 between President al-Bashir and Southern hero John Garang guaranteed a referendum on the status of the South to be held in 2011. The thinking was that this time could be used to convince the political elites from the North and the South of the benefits of working together, so they could subsequently either come up with a new agreement or convince the Southern people that a unified Sudan is not that bad. Unfortunately, with the violence in Darfur, the ICC indictment, and the unfortunate death of John Garang, the elites have been more than a little distracted.

If the vote were held today, the vast majority of Southerners would vote to secede from Sudan, a situation that is unlikely to change in the next two years. The North would not be too happy about this because of oil and the effect that would have on the rest of the country. Similarly, the South Sudan Government is not known as the most well-functioning government around and could quite possibly turn into a fragile or failed state itself.

Basically, the possibilities for violence in the case of a secession by the South are all-too-likely, even as it appears that this situation is an eventuality. So how do we prevent a possible future humanitarian crisis even while trying to solve the one that is happening right now?

The writer of the briefing paper has a few ideas to this end, but none of them are simple. Along the basic things that need to happen to prevent catastrophic war in 2011 are:

1) Ending the violence in Darfur.
2) More implementation of the parts of the Comprehensive Peace Treaty that have still not been implemented.
3) An agreement between political elites in the North and the South about how to proceed with the referendum. Postponing it could lose the Southern leaders their legitimacy; holding it could lose the Northerners a large chunk of their country.
4) Coming up with a contingency plan for how to deal with the possibility of a vote for secession.

Is that all? That should be easy in a country that has had a total of 13 years peace since 1956.

I hope you are all up for challenges…

“You cannot call them a unified group with one political ideology, but they are all angry…That is the factor unifying them.”

This article touches on a couple really good points that I’d like to stress here:

1) the situation in the camps drastically complicates the rebel groups’ ability to negotiate. We’ve already seen that with exiled rebel leader Abdul Wahid al-Nur who frequently takes an extremely hard-lined position in order to consolidate his support among radical elements in the camps. This article suggests that the inhabitants of the camps are so anti-government that any rebel group seen to negotiate would immediately lose legitimacy in their eyes and possibly even put people of their similar ethnicity in danger of reprisals (rebel groups tend to line-up with ethnicity in Darfur).

2) The article briefly touches on something that jumped out at me from this article. Does anyone else see the resemblance in this scenario of situations in Afghanistan, Somalia, or Lebanon? Basically, in a lawless environment, people turn to radical elements that are able to provide meaning and bestow some semblance of order in an unstable world. The Taliban did this in Afghanistan following the country’s many civil wars in the ’90s. The Shabab, or Islamic Youth, in Somalia are also seen as the only real possibility for order in the country, despite their brutal tactics. The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are still sources of trouble in that country as well.

Basically, this is a worrying scenario. The government doesn’t know how to deal with it (and is probably unable to deal with it actually). These youth are angry, frustrated, and disillusioned with both the international community and the rebel groups. And, something that the article does not touch on is the fact that they all have guns – I recently spoke with someone who returned from the camps and was just floored by the sheer number of guns available. These “mobilized” youth could become a source of violence and trouble for a long-time to come in the country.

I don’t really know that there is any easy way to deal with this situation, other than try to stem the number of weapons entering the camps, provide some sort of opportunity for the youth, and work to end the war. I’d love to hear more thoughts, but this situation is definitely something to look out for…